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ABSTRACT
Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling
games in extensive form with generic payo®s. The axioms require undomi-
nated strategies (admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (back-
ward induction), and dependence only on the game's normal form even when
embedded in a larger game with redundant strategies or irrelevant players
(small worlds). The axioms are satis¯ed by a set that is stable (Mertens,
1989) and conversely the axioms imply that each selected set is stable and
thus an essential component of admissible equilibria with the same outcome.AXIOMATIC THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
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Abstract. Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling
games in extensive form with generic payo®s. The axioms require undominated strategies
(admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and dependence
only on the game's normal form even when embedded in a larger game with redundant
strategies or irrelevant players (small worlds). The axioms are satis¯ed by a set that is
stable (Mertens, 1989) and conversely the axioms imply that each selected set is stable and
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1. Introduction
Kohlberg and Mertens [19] argue that Nash's [27, 28] criterion of equilibrium in a non-
cooperative game should be re¯ned by applying principles from decision theory.
1 As in the
single-person case, the goal is to obtain sharp predictions from axioms that specify minimal
requirements for rational behavior in multi-person contexts.
We prove that three axioms adapted from decision theory imply that a re¯nement selects
stable sets (Mertens [24]) for signaling games with generic payo®s.
2 The methods developed
here enable a similar conclusion for general games in extensive form with perfect recall, two
players, and generic payo®s that will be published in a later working paper|our intent here
is to present the main ideas for the simpler case of signaling games.
Section 2 establishes notation for Section 3, which speci¯es Axioms A (admissibility), B
(backward induction), and S (small worlds). Except for Axiom S's more general version of
small worlds, these axioms are among those proposed by Kohlberg and Mertens [19]. The
axioms are stated for general games in extensive form with perfect recall. Section 4 proves
the main theorem for signaling games with generic payo®s. Appendices A and B establish
technical properties used in the proof. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2. Notation
A typical game in extensive form is denoted ¡. Its speci¯cation includes a set N of players,
a game tree that has perfect recall for each player, and an assignment of real-valued utility
payo®s to all players at each terminal node of the tree. The tree can include a speci¯ed
mixed strategy of Nature. We assume throughout the standard epistemic conditions that
the game is common knowledge and that players' rationality is common knowledge.
Denote player n's simplex of mixed strategies by §n and interpret its vertices as his set Sn
of pure strategies. A pure strategy assigns an action at each of the player's information sets.
The sets of pro¯les of players' pure and mixed strategies are S =
Q
n Sn and § =
Q
n §n. The
normal form of a game assigns to each pro¯le of players' pure strategies the pro¯le of their
expected payo®s; equivalently, it is the multilinear function G : § ! RN that assigns to each
pro¯le of mixed strategies the players' expected payo®s from that pro¯le. A player's pure
strategy is redundant if its payo®s for all players are replicated by a mixture of his other pure
strategies. The reduced normal form G± : §± ! RN is the normal form obtained from G by
deleting redundant pure strategies to obtain the reduced set S± of pro¯les of pure strategies,
1Also see Kohlberg [18]. Hillas and Kohlberg [17] survey subsequent developments.
2This class of generic games is studied by Banks and Sobel [1], Cho and Kreps [4], Cho and Sobel [5],
Fudenberg and Tirole [8, Chap. 11], and Kreps and Sobel [21], among others.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 3
which is unique up to labeling of pure strategies. Each pure strategy in the normal form has
an equivalent representation as a pure or mixed strategy in its reduced normal form.
As de¯ned by Nash [27, 28], an equilibrium is a pro¯le of players' strategies such that
each player's strategy is an optimal reply to other players' strategies. That is, if BRn(¾) ´
argmax¾0
n2§n Gn(¾0
n;¾¡n) is player n's best-reply correspondence, then ¾ 2 § is an equilib-
rium i® ¾n 2 BRn(¾) for every player n. We represent an equilibrium by a pro¯le of mixed
strategies but for a game in extensive form with perfect recall there exists an equivalent
representation in behavioral strategies (Kuhn [23]).
A re¯nement is a correspondence that assigns to each game a nonempty collection of
nonempty connected closed subsets of its equilibria. This restriction on its range re°ects the
premise that equilibrium is a basic implication of common knowledge of players' rationality
when there is no coordination mechanism to correlate their strategies. Each selected subset
is called a solution. A typical solution is denoted S
¤.
For the axioms in Section 3 we assume straightaway that solutions are sets because there
need not exist a single equilibrium that satis¯es the axioms (Kohlberg and Mertens [19,
pp. 1015, 1019, 1029]). The technical requirement that a solution is connected excludes the
trivial re¯nement that always selects the set of all equilibria. Recall too that for a game
with generic payo®s, all equilibria in a connected subset (and thus its closure) have the same
outcome and thus the same paths of equilibrium play.3 In Section 5.1 we develop further
justi¯cation for re¯nements that select connected sets.
3. The Axioms
3.1. Axiom A: Admissibility. The ¯rst axiom requires that each player uses only admis-
sible strategies, de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition 3.1 (Admissible Strategy). A player's strategy is admissible if it is an optimal
reply to some pro¯le of completely mixed strategies.
That is, ¾n 2 §n is admissible if ¾n 2 BRn(^ ¾) for some ^ ¾ 2 § n @§.
For a game with two players a strategy is admissible i® it is not weakly dominated by
another strategy. Thus in this case admissibility is the same as in decision theory.
Say that a pro¯le of players' strategies is admissible if each player's strategy is admissible.
Axiom A [Admissibility]: Each equilibrium in a solution is admissible.
3Kreps and Wilson [22, Theorem 2]. S. Elmes' corrections to the alternative proof in Kohlberg and
Mertens [19, Appendix C] are noted in [12, p. 9079]. We use here the stronger characterization in [11] for
which nongeneric payo®s lie in a lower dimensional subset.4 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
We invoke admissibility as the ¯rst axiom because we anticipate the case of two players|a
stronger version is required for games with more than two players. In Section 5 we remark
that admissibility can be replaced by an axiom requiring that a solution is a minimal set
satisfying the two other axioms.
3.2. Axiom B: Backward Induction. The second axiom invokes consistent beliefs and
sequential equilibrium as de¯ned by Kreps and Wilson [22, p. 872].
De¯nition 3.2 (Consistent Beliefs). A player's belief assigns to each of his information sets
a conditional probability distribution over pro¯les of players' and Nature's strategies that
satis¯es Bayes' rule where de¯ned. Players' beliefs are consistent with an equilibrium if they
are limits of conditional probabilities induced by a sequence of pro¯les of completely mixed
strategies converging to the equilibrium.
This de¯nition appears to depart from standard decision theory because it invokes perturbed
strategies, but Kohlberg and Reny [20] show that consistency of beliefs can be derived from
primitive axioms appropriate for a frequency interpretation of probabilities. Kreps and
Wilson interpret a belief at an information set as only the conditional distribution over its
nodes induced by a belief as de¯ned above, but we omit this unnecessary restriction. In [15]
we provide motivation for the general speci¯cation used here.
De¯nition 3.3 (Sequential Equilibrium). An equilibrium is sequential if there exists a pro-
¯le of consistent beliefs such that, conditional on a player's belief at an information set,
the continuation of his strategy is an optimal reply to the pro¯le of players' and Nature's
strategies.
This property is called sequential rationality. Sequential equilibria are usually speci¯ed by
behavioral strategies but we omit this aspect here.
The second axiom ensures that some equilibrium in a solution is sequentially rational:
Axiom B [Backward Induction]: Each solution contains a sequential equilibrium.
The two axioms of admissibility and backward induction account for di®erences in the
de¯nition of stability in Kohlberg and Mertens [19] and the de¯nition in Mertens [24]. The
former reject re¯nements called hyperstability and full stability that violate admissibility,
and they judge inadequate their tentative de¯nition of stability (called here KM-stability)
because it violates backward induction. Unlike Mertens, Kohlberg and Mertens do not
require that a selected set is connected. Mertens' revised de¯nition of stability satis¯es both
admissibility and backward induction, as well as the third axiom that we describe next.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 5
3.3. Axiom S: Small Worlds. The ¯rst two axioms invoke principles of rational decisions
by individuals. The third axiom requires that a re¯nement is not a®ected by extraneous fea-
tures. It implies two criteria called invariance and small-worlds by Kohlberg and Mertens [19]
and Mertens [26], respectively. To motivate the third axiom we de¯ne these criteria sepa-
rately before stating their generalization.
Invariance. As in decision theory, invariance requires that it is irrelevant whether a
mixed strategy is treated as a pure strategy, i.e. it excludes dependence on a presentation
e®ect. Because a given normal form is just its reduced normal form augmented by redundant
pure strategies, invariance is de¯ned as follows:
De¯nition 3.4 (Invariance). A re¯nement satis¯es invariance if it depends only on each
game's reduced normal form.
That is, the solutions for any two games with the same reduced normal forms have the same
equivalent representations as a solution of the reduced normal form.
Invariance requires a re¯nement to inherit the property of equilibria that they depend only
on the reduced normal form.4 This enforces the decision-theoretic principle that rational
decisions are not a®ected by presentation e®ects, that is, not a®ected by which among
many equivalent extensive forms represent the same essential strategic situation (Dalkey [7],
Thompson [31], Kohlberg and Mertens [19]).
Say that two games in extensive form with perfect recall are equivalent if they have the
same normal form and hence the same reduced normal form. Then backward induction and
invariance together require that a solution contains an invariant sequential equilibrium that
is sequential in every equivalent game. Examples are analyzed in detail in [14, x2.3] and
[15, x2,7] to show how the sequential equilibria of an extensive-form game are re¯ned by
applying these two criteria to expanded games obtained by appending redundant strategies.
More generally, [15] uses the properties of invariant sequential equilibria to prove that these
criteria imply forward induction for two-player games with generic payo®s.
Small-worlds. In decision theory, the small-worlds criterion posits that rational decisions
are not a®ected by presentations in expanded contexts with additional features irrelevant for
optimal choices (Savage [29, x5.5]). Equilibria satisfy the following analog of the small-worlds
criterion.
4Equilibria also depend only on players' best-reply correspondences, as in the decision-theoretic formula-
tion of revealed preferences. We do not invoke this property explicitly, but it is implied by Theorem 4.1 below
due to the demonstration in Govindan and Mertens [10] that the de¯nition of stable sets can be modi¯ed to
depend only on players' best-reply correspondences.6 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Using the normal form for simplicity, say that a game G : § ! RN is trivially embedded in
a game ~ G : §£§o ! RN[o with additional players in a set o (the `outsiders') if the feasible
pure strategies and their payo®s for the players in N (the `insiders') remain the same as in
G. That is, outsiders are dummy players in the game among insiders. Because the best-reply
correspondences of insiders are independent of outsiders' strategies, each equilibrium of the
larger game ~ G projects to an equilibrium of G. The small-worlds criterion requires that a
re¯nement inherits this property of equilibria.
De¯nition 3.5 (Small-Worlds). A re¯nement satis¯es small-worlds if the solutions for each
game are projections of the solutions for any larger game in which the game is trivially
embedded.
This is the version of small-worlds proposed by Mertens [26].
The small-worlds criterion is distinct from invariance because the latter considers a non-
trivial embedding in which players have additional redundant strategies. However, the two
share common features that we exploit in De¯nition 3.6 below. In the case of invariance one
considers a game ~ G with sets ~ Sn of pure strategies for players n 2 N, and its reduced normal
form ~ G± = G with players' sets Sn of pure strategies such that pure strategies in ~ Sn nSn are
payo®-equivalent (for all players) to mixed strategies in §n. A mathematical statement of
this situation is that for each player n there exists an a±ne surjective map ~ fn : ~ §n ! §n
that maps pure strategies in ~ §n to payo®-equivalent mixed strategies in §n and maps other
mixed strategies by linear interpolation. A general statement of the converse is that there
exist a±ne surjective maps ~ f = ( ~ fn) that preserve payo®s, i.e. each ~ Gn = Gn ± ~ f. Small-
worlds considers the special case that ~ f is the projection map from strategies in § £ §o to
insiders' strategies in §. The third axiom, called small worlds without a hyphen, considers
the general case.
The small worlds axiom is more general than invariance and small-worlds, but it is moti-
vated by similar considerations. It excludes dependence on another presentation e®ect when
the embedding in a larger game is not trivial, and not due solely to redundant strategies.
One usually interprets a player's mixed or behavioral strategy as implemented by a private
randomization. But if the game is embedded in a larger game with additional players then
the player might use private observations of outsiders' actions as a source of his randomiza-
tion. But conditioning on outsiders' actions enlarges the player's set of pure strategies, so
the embedding cannot be trivial. Nevertheless, among insiders the larger game has the same
reduced normal form as the original game, so any dependence on the embedding is again a
presentation e®ect.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 7
Embedding. We de¯ne the general form of embedding as follows, using again a formu-
lation in terms of the normal form.
De¯nition 3.6 (Embedding). A pair ( ~ G;f) embeds a game G : § ! RN if ~ G : ~ § £ §o !
RN[o is a game with additional players in o, and maps f = (fn)n2N satisfy: (a) each
fn : ~ §n £ §o ! §n is a multilinear map; (b) for each ¯xed ¾o 2 §o, fn(¢;¾o) is surjective;
and (c) ~ GN = G ± f.
Hereafter we say that ~ G is a metagame for G if there exists f such that ( ~ G;f) embeds G.
We omit description of f for the analogous metagame in extensive form that embeds a game
in extensive or normal form.
Invariance uses the special case in which G is the reduced normal form of ~ G, viz., §o is
a single point and each fn maps strategies in ~ §n to payo®-equivalent strategies in §n. The
small-worlds criterion uses the trivial embedding in which ~ § = § and f is the projection
map.
More generally, embedding allows that insiders can have more pure strategies in ~ § than
in §, provided there is no net e®ect on their sets of strategies (conditions (a) and (b)), and
no net e®ect on their payo®s (condition (c)).
The proof in Section 4 uses the special case mentioned above in which an insider's private
observation of outsiders' actions (or additional moves of Nature in the larger game) substi-
tutes for his private randomization. In this case, a player n obtains a larger set of strategies
in ~ §n by conditioning his choice among his pure strategies in §n on an outsider's action,
and fn maps such a strategy in ~ §n into the strategy in §n that is chosen conditional on
observations of outsiders' strategies. From the viewpoint of other insiders, player n's choice
of a strategy in ~ §n is equivalent to the strategy in §n that is its image under f.
Note that Nash equilibria are not a®ected by embedding in a metagame:
Proposition 3.7. If ( ~ G;f) embeds a game G then the equilibria of G are the f-images of
the equilibria of ~ G.
Proof. Suppose (~ ¾;¾o) is an equilibrium of ~ G, and let ¾ = f(~ ¾;¾o). For any insider n and his
strategy ¿n 2 §n there exists ~ ¿n 2 ~ §n such that fn(~ ¿n;¾o) = ¿n because fn(¢;¾o) is surjective
by condition (b). Using condition (c) and the best-reply property of the equilibrium,
Gn(¾¡n;¿n) = Gn ± f(~ ¾¡n; ~ ¿n;¾
o) = ~ Gn(~ ¾n; ~ ¿n;¾
o) 6 ~ Gn(~ ¾;¾
o) = Gn ± f(~ ¾;¾
o) = Gn(¾);
where the inequality obtains because (~ ¾;¾o) is an equilibrium of ~ G. Hence ¾ is an equilibrium
of G. Conversely, suppose ¾ is an equilibrium of G. De¯ne the correspondence Á : ~ §£§o ³8 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
~ § £ §o from the strategy space of ~ G to itself by letting Á(~ ¿;¿o) be the set of (~ ¾;¾o) such
that fn(~ ¾n;¿o) = ¾n for each insider n, and ¾o is a best reply for the outsiders to (~ ¿;¿o).
Then Á has nonempty values because each fn(¢;¿o) is surjective by condition (b), and values
are closed and convex because f is multilinear by condition (a). The correspondence is
upper-semi-continuous because the multilinearity of f implies that it is continuous. The
assumptions of Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem are thus satis¯ed, so there exists a ¯xed
point (~ ¾;¾o) of Á. By construction, ¾o is a best reply to (~ ¾;¾o). That ~ ¾ is also a best reply
to (~ ¾;¾o) is established as follows. For each insider n, fn(~ ¾n;¾o) = ¾n. For each insider n
and ~ ¿n 2 ~ §n, let ¿n = fn(~ ¿n;¾o). Then
~ Gn(~ ¿n; ~ ¾¡n;¾
o) = Gn ± f(~ ¿n; ~ ¾¡n;¾
o) = Gn(¿n;¾¡n) 6 Gn(¾) = Gn ± f(~ ¾;¾
o) = ~ Gn(~ ¾;¾
o);
where the inequality obtains because ¾ is an equilibrium of G. Therefore (~ ¾;¾o) is an
equilibrium of ~ G. ¤
The Small Worlds Axiom. Because embedding preserves the reduced normal form
among insiders, the third axiom is the following generalization of invariance and small-
worlds.
Axiom S [Small Worlds]: If ( ~ G;f) embeds G then the images under f of the solutions that
a re¯nement selects for ~ G are the solutions selected for G.
In particular, for each solution S
¤ of G, Axioms B and S together require that for any
extensive-form game ~ ¡ with perfect recall and the normal form ~ G there exists a sequential
equilibrium ~ ¾ in a solution ~ S
¤
of ~ ¡ and ~ G such that f(~ ¾) 2 S
¤ = f(~ S
¤
). This property is the
fulcrum of the proof in Section 4.
The small worlds axiom strengthens the exclusion of presentation e®ects by requiring that
a re¯nement depend only on each game's reduced normal form even when the embedding is
nontrivial.5 Even so, Axiom S does not exclude the possibility that embedding in a metagame
accounts for a `focal point,' i.e. the context in which a game presented to the insiders might
account for which solution, or which equilibrium in that solution is used, explains the outcome
of the insiders' strategic interaction. Thus the re¯nement may be incomplete because it does
not necessarily identify a unique solution nor a unique equilibrium in a solution.
5The proof in Section 4 requires only that the re¯nement selects subsets for G that are images under f of
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To summarize: we study re¯nements whose solutions are subsets of equilibria that use only
admissible strategies and that contain an equilibrium that is sequential, and for which solu-
tions are independent of embedding in metagames with additional strategies and additional
players.
4. Signaling Games
This section proves for signaling games with generic payo®s that Axioms A, B, S char-
acterize a signi¯cant property of a re¯nement. We show that each solution is a stable set
as de¯ned by Mertens [24]. Thus, for such games any further re¯nement is restricted to
selecting among stable sets.
The proof shows in particular that each solution is a component of admissible strategies
whose neighborhood in the space of pairs of a belief and a strategy has an essential projection
into the space of beliefs. There are two remarkable aspects. One is that it is necessary to
select an entire component of admissible strategies. Even though admissibility and backward
induction can be satis¯ed by a single equilibrium, the small worlds axiom implies that all
admissible equilibria in a component must be included in a solution to account for all the
metagames in which the signaling game can be embedded. The second is that stable sets are
identi¯ed by properties of nearby games with perturbed strategy sets but the axioms invoke
only properties of a given game and its embeddings in metagames.
6
We begin by de¯ning signaling games and stating the main theorem, and then subsequent
subsections present its proof.
4.1. De¯nitions and the Theorem. A signaling game is a game in extensive-form with
perfect recall, two players in N = f1;2g, and a tree obtained from the three ¯nite sets
T;M;R. The tree has three stages:
(1) Nature chooses player 1's type t 2 T with a speci¯ed probability ¼t > 0.
(2) After observing his type t, player 1 sends a message m 2 M to player 2.
(3) After observing 1's message m, but not 1's type t, player 2 chooses a response r 2 R.
Thus, player 1 has perfect information but player 2 observes only 1's message. In the normal
form, player 1's set of pure strategies is S1 = MT and 2's is S2 = RM. In the extensive form,
the set of terminal nodes is Z = T £ M £ R. Player 1's set of behavioral strategies is the
set of T £ M stochastic matrices in B1 = ¢(M)T with typical member ¹ = (¹t)t2T, and 2's
set of behavioral strategies is the set of M £ R stochastic matrices in B2 = ¢(R)M with
6This indicates that analyses of perturbed games can be construed as shortcuts to analyses of metagames.
This view is important for the foundations of game theory because ultimately a theory of rational play must
pertain to the actual game, which in Axiom S is the game among insiders.10 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
typical member ½ = (½m)m2M. That is, ¹t(m) is 1's probability of sending message m after
observing his type t, and ½m(r) is 2's probability of her reply r after observing message m.
The speci¯cation of a signaling game ¡ is completed by assigning a payo® un(t;m;r) to
each player n at each terminal node (t;m;r) 2 Z. The payo® assignment u is a point in
U = RN£Z. A well-known example of a signaling game is the Beer-Quiche game studied by
Cho and Kreps [4, xII] and analyzed further in [15, x2.2].
We assume that payo®s are generic, that is, we specify a lower dimensional subset U± of
U such that the theorem is true if u 2 U n U±. The conditions for genericity are speci¯ed
cumulatively during the proof, using the property that the intersection of two generic classes
is generic, or equivalently U± is the union of lower dimensional sets of payo®s excluded in
successive steps of the proof. Prominent examples of nongeneric payo®s occur in `cheap talk'
signaling games in which player 1's payo®s do not depend on his message (Crawford and
Sobel [6], Chen, Kartik and Sobel [3]).
The Main Theorem. We prove the following:
Theorem 4.1. For signaling games with generic payo®s, Axioms A, B, S imply that solutions
are stable sets.
Since admissibility is basically a minimality requirement, the gist is this. Suppose one
accepts sequential rationality but prefers an alternative solution that is not stable. The
theorem establishes that the game can be embedded in a larger game for which no sequential
equilibrium is equivalent for insiders to any equilibrium (sequential or not) in the alternative
solution. The re¯nement that selects this alternative solution therefore depends on how
insiders are in°uenced by alternative embeddings, i.e. on presentation e®ects.
Mertens [24, 25] proves for general games that stable sets satisfy Axiom A, Axiom B,
invariance, and small-worlds. A modi¯cation of his proof extends this conclusion to Axiom
S. We prove a converse here: if a re¯nement satis¯es Axioms A, B, S then there is a lower
dimensional set U± of payo® assignments such that if ¡ is a signaling game with payo®s
u 2 U n U± then each solution S
¤ is a stable set of the equilibria of ¡.
The proof is broken into several steps, and a technical construction is consigned to Ap-
pendix A. Subsection 4.2 uses special features of signaling games to reduce the problem to
minimal considerations. Subsection 4.3 de¯nes three objects invoked in proving stability.
Mertens' general de¯nition requires essentiality of the map that is the projection from a
neighborhood in the graph of equilibria to a space of perturbed games obtained from per-
turbed strategies. For signaling games we show that it su±ces to prove essentiality of the
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a message from player 1 that is not sent in any equilibrium in the solution. Subsection 4.3
proves essentiality of this projection, and also proves that a solution is an entire component
of admissible strategies. The proof shows that if a solution S
¤ is not an entire component of
admissible strategies, or if for some unsent message the projection from belief-strategy pairs
to beliefs is an inessential map, then there exists a metagame (~ ¡;f) that embeds ¡ for which
the image ¾ = f(~ ¾) of each sequential equilibrium ~ ¾ of ~ ¡ is not in S
¤ | thus, either Axiom
B or Axiom S is violated. The ¯nal step of the proof is relegated to Appendix B, which
proves that these properties imply that a solution is a stable set as de¯ned by Mertens [24].
4.2. Preliminaries. We start with preliminaries concerning the structure of the problem.
Because ¡ has perfect recall it is su±cient to represent equilibria in terms of players'
behavioral strategies (Kuhn [23]). Moreover, due to the simple structure of a signaling
game, to prove stability of a solution represented in normal-form strategies it is su±cient to
prove the requisite properties for the game's agent-normal form or for its representation in
behavioral strategies. Therefore, we assume henceforth that a solution S
¤ is represented in
behavioral strategies.
Assume initially that U n U± is included in the generic set for which all equilibria in a
connected set have the same outcome, i.e. the same play along paths of equilibrium play and
thus the same probability distribution on terminal nodes and the same equilibrium payo®s.
Because solutions are connected sets, all equilibria in a solution S
¤ induce the same outcome.
Therefore, player 1's strategy is the same, say ¹¤, for all equilibria in the solution S
¤. For
each type t, let M¤
t = supp(¹¤
t) be the set of messages sent with positive probability by 1's
type t in equilibrium, and let M¤ = [tM¤
t be the set of all messages sent by equilibria in
S
¤. For each message m 2 M¤, player 2's strategy after seeing m is also constant across the
equilibria in S
¤, say ½¤
m. Thus, the only variation among equilibria in S
¤ is among strategies
of player 2 after receiving messages in the set M± = M n M¤ of unsent messages when play
adheres to an equilibrium in S
¤.
For each type t of player 1, let v¤
t be his equilibrium payo®, and let v¤ be the vector of
these payo®s. For player 2, let B2± =
Q
m2M± Bm = f(½m)m2M± j ½ 2 B2g where Bm = ¢(R)




±. Also for each m 2 M±, let S
¤
m be the projection of S








Along an equilibrium path (i.e. after a message m 2 M¤), player 2 can compute the
unique conditional distribution over 1's types and pure strategies given the message she
observed and 1's equilibrium strategy. Necessarily this posterior distribution is her belief
at that information set if the equilibrium is sequential. After an unsent message, she need12 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
not have a uniquely implied belief, even among sequential equilibria. Even so, an important
discovery by Cho and Kreps [4] is that KM-stability as de¯ned by Kohlberg and Mertens [19]
imposes signi¯cant restrictions on the range of beliefs for which her strategy is optimal, and
thus on the equilibria in a KM-stable set. Moreover, for a class of games that includes the
ones studied here, we show in [15] that backward induction and invariance imply forward
induction, which is also a restriction on beliefs at information sets o® the paths of equilibrium
play. Similarly, the gist of the proof here is to show that Axioms A, B, S impose restrictions
on beliefs that ultimately imply stability. Thus in Subsection 4.3 below, Proposition 4.2 and
its proof are cast in terms of restrictions on 2's beliefs implied by the axioms.
Thus for each unsent message m 2 M± let Pm ´ ¢(T) be the set of 2's possible beliefs
about 1's types after observing m. Her belief about 1's types is the only payo®-relevant part
of her belief since she observes his message and player 1 has no further moves.
4.3. The Essentiality Property. Cho and Kreps [4] establish for generic payo®s that S
¤
contains a KM-stable set i® for each unsent message m 2 M± and belief pm 2 Pm there exist
½m 2 S
¤
m, ¸ 2 (0;1] and Ám 2 Pm such that ½m is an optimal reply for 2 when her belief is
¸pm+(1¡¸)Ám, and if ¸ < 1 then sending message m yields player 1 his equilibrium payo®
v¤
t for every type t in the support of Ám. Appendix B proves that stability as de¯ned by
Mertens [24] is implied by the stronger property that the projection from the set of all such
pairs (pm;½m) of 2's beliefs and strategies|those for which there exist ¸ and Ám satisfying
the above conditions|to the set Pm of beliefs is an essential map. Therefore, the proof
here proceeds by ¯rst proving that S
¤ satis¯es this essentiality property, and then proving
that this essentiality property implies stability. The next three paragraphs de¯ne the three
objects needed for the ¯rst part.
1. Components of admissible strategies. Neither player moves twice in a signaling
game, so the admissibility required by Axiom A is equivalent to requiring conditional ad-
missibility of 2's behavioral strategy after each unsent message. A response r after message
m is conditionally admissible for player 2 i® it is an optimal reply for some belief with full
support. Axiom A implies that S
¤
m for an unsent message m 2 M± is contained in the subset
of conditionally admissible strategies in ¢(R) such that no type t gets a payo® exceeding v¤
t
by choosing m; moreover, this latter set has ¯nitely many connected components. Let S
²
m be
the unique connected component of this set that contains S
¤












2. The graph of 2's beliefs and optimal responses. De¯ne Xm as the set of
(pm;½m) 2 Pm £ ¢(R) such that there exist ¸ 2 [0;1] and Ám 2 Pm such that:
(i) ½m is a best reply for 2 to the belief ¸pm + (1 ¡ ¸)Ám, andAXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 13
(ii) if ¸ < 1 then sending m yields v¤
t for each type t of 1 in the support of Ám.
A further restriction on the set of generic payo®s ensures that the weight ¸ cannot actually
be zero. Indeed, suppose ½m is a strategy against which 1's types in a subset T 0 ½ T
get their equilibrium payo®s by sending m. Then for a generic set of player 1's payo®s,
jT 0j < jsupp(½m)j. But for a generic set of 2's payo®s this implies that there does not exist a
belief Ám with support contained in T 0 against which the strategies in the support of ½m are
equally good replies. Thus any belief for which ½m is a best reply must have strictly larger
support than the set of types for whom sending message m is not inferior.
3. The projection map. Let qm be the projection map from Xm to Pm. De¯ne
@Xm = q¡1
m (@Pm), where @Pm is the boundary of Pm. Appendix A shows that further
restrictions on the generic set of payo®s imply that (Xm;@Xm) is a (jTj ¡ 1)-dimensional
pseudo-manifold with boundary. That is, Xm is connected and can be expressed as the union
of simplices of dimension (jTj ¡ 1) such that every maximal proper face of a simplex is a
face of at most one other simplex, and @Xm is the union of those maximal proper faces of
simplices that are not faces of a second simplex. Since (Xm;@Xm) is a pseudo-manifold of the
same dimension as Pm, the topological degree of the projection map qm is well-de¯ned. This
degree, denoted dm, is a non-negative integer that provides an algebraic count of the number
of points in q¡1
m (pm) that is the same for every belief pm in a generic subset of Pm. The
map qm is essential i® dm is nonzero. This characterization of essentiality is equivalent to the
following one used here: qm is essential if every map hm : Xm ! Pm has a point of coincidence
with qm, i.e. there exists (pm;½m) 2 Xm such that hm(pm;½m) = qm(pm;½m) ´ pm.
Essentiality of qm for each m 2 M± is equivalent to essentiality of the composite map
q ´ £m2M±qm. Appendix B shows further that this implies essentiality of the projection map
from a neighborhood of S
¤ in the graph of equilibria to the space of perturbed strategies, as
used in Mertens' general de¯nition of stability.
4.4. The Link Between the Axioms and Stability. This subsection proves the crucial





± and qm is essential for each m 2 M±.
That is, for unsent messages the solution S
¤
± is the entire component S
²
± of admissible strate-
gies, and the projection maps from pairs of 2's beliefs and strategies conditional on unsent
messages are essential. These imply that the solution S
¤ is an entire component of admissible
strategies, and the projection maps from pairs of 2's beliefs and strategies conditional on all
messages are essential.14 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Proof of Proposition. We show that if the proposition is false then there is a metagame that
embeds ¡ but has no sequential equilibrium equivalent for the insiders to one in S
¤, which
violates Axiom B or S. The proof has two long parts: the ¯rst constructs the metagame and
the second shows that it cannot have the requisite sequential equilibrium.
I.1. Construction of the metagame: preliminaries.




± or qm is inessential for some unsent message m 2 M±. For
each m 2 M choose a strategy ½m 2 S
²




± then (½m)m2M± = 2 S
¤
±. Since ½m
is admissible, there exists pm 2 Pmn@Pm such that ½m is a conditional best reply for player 2
against the posterior pm. Therefore, (pm;½m) 2 Xmn@Xm. There now exists a neighborhood
Am of (pm;½m) such that Am is homeomorphic to a (jTj ¡ 1)-dimensional simplex, and if
dm0 6= 0 for all m0 2 M± then the projection from
Q
m0 Am0 to S
²
± is disjoint from S
¤
±.
The Hopf extension theorem (Spanier [30, x8.1.18]) assures existence of a map ~ fm : Xm !
Pm such that the restrictions of ~ fm and qm to @Xm agree and such that: (i) if dm = 0 then
~ fm(Xm) µ @Pm; and (ii) if dm 6= 0 then fm(Xm n (Am n @Am)) µ @Pm and fm(Am) = Pm.
Fix a point ~ pm in the interior of Pm and construct a map ' from Pm to Pm that has ~ pm as
its only ¯xed point, as follows: '(~ pm) = ~ pm; for pm 2 @Pm, '(pm) is the unique point in
@Pm that is on the line from pm through ~ pm; map all other pm by linear interpolation, i.e.
'(¸pm +(1¡¸)~ pm) = ¸'(pm)+(1¡¸)~ pm for all pm 2 @Pm and ¸ 2 [0;1]. By construction,
~ pm is the only ¯xed point of '. Let fm = '± ~ fm. Then fm has no point of coincidence with qm
unless qm unless essential, in which case the only points of coincidence are those in q¡1(~ pm)
and therefore are contained in Am n @Am. Extend each fm to a map from Pm £ ¢(R)
to Pm, denoting it still by fm. Choose ® > 0 such that for each m and (pm;½m) 2 Xm,
kfm(pm;½m) ¡ pmk < ® only if dm 6= 0 and (pm;½m) 2 Am n @Am.
For each m 2 M± take a simplicial subdivision Km of Pm such that the diameter of each
simplex Km of Km is strictly smaller than ®=2. Also take a further simplicial subdivision
Lm of Km and one Tm of ¢(R) such that fm has a multisimplicial approximation gm from
Lm£Tm to Km.7 Suppose for (pm;½m) 2 Xm, gm(pm;½m) and pm belong to a simplex of Km.
Then, kfm(pm;½m) ¡ pmk 6 kfm(pm;½m) ¡ gm(pm;½m)k + kgm(pm;½m) ¡ pmk < ®. Thus, in
this case dm 6= 0 and (pm;½m) 2 Am. Let Pm be a polyhedral subdivision of Lm£Tm and let
Qm be the set of full-dimensional polyhedra of Pm. For each m 2 M± let Vm be the vertex
set of Km. Each vertex vm 2 Vm corresponds to a belief in Pm, and we denote it by pvm.
I.2. Construction of the metagame: the game tree.
7See [13, Appendix B] for the theory of multisimplices and multisimplicial approximation.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 15
For each small but positive ±, embed the normal form G of ¡ in a metagame ~ G± derived
from an extensive form ~ ¡± speci¯ed as follows. Let S¤
1 be the set of pure strategies for player
1 in ¡ that choose some m 2 M¤ for each type t. There is nothing to prove if S¤
1 = S1 so
assume that S¤
1 6= S1. The game begins with player 1 deciding whether to play a strategy
in S¤
1 or not. If he decides to play one of these, then next he chooses which one of these to
play. Following each of these choices there is a copy of the signaling game ¡ in which player
1's chosen strategy is automatically implemented. If he decides not to play a strategy in S¤
1
then outsiders om;1, one for each m 2 M±, move simultaneously: om;1 picks a vertex vm in the
vertex set Vm of Km. Player 1 observes privately the choices made by these outsiders. Then
he decides which among his pure strategies in S1nS¤
1 to play, or he can choose an additional
one depending on the pro¯le of observed choices v = (vm). This pure strategy, denoted s±;v,
is a mixed strategy in ¡ that is equivalent to the following behavioral strategy, which exists
if ± is small: each type t chooses m 2 M± with probability (±=¼t)pvm(t) and chooses each
m 2 M¤ n M¤
t with zero probability. After each of these pure strategies follows a copy of
the signaling game ¡ with the chosen pure strategy for player 1 implemented automatically.
Player 2 moves after all these choices by player 1 and the ¯rst group of outsiders (om;1) are
made, and knowing only the message sent by player 1. After player 2's choice of a response,
if some message in M± was chosen by player 1 then all outsiders om;2 and om;3 for m 2 M±
move simultaneously. The only information they have is that some message in M± was sent.
An outsider om;2 chooses a vertex wm in Vm, and an outsider om;3 chooses a polyhedron Qm
in Qm.
Observe that player 2's information and strategies are exactly as in ¡. Player 1's strategy
set includes S¤
1 plus choices of other pure strategies for each possible choice of the ¯rst group
of outsiders. The game ~ ¡± is easily seen to embed ¡ regardless of the payo®s to the outsiders,
since the outsiders are dummy players in the game between players 1 and 2, and player 1
conditions his strategy only on private observations of choices by the ¯rst outsiders that are
not observed by player 2.
I.3. Construction of the metagame: outsiders' payo®s.
We now describe the payo®s to the outsiders. Each outsider om;1 wants to mimic his
counterpart om;2. In particular, for each pure strategy choice vm of om;1 and wm of om;2,
de¯ne um;1(vm;wm) to be 1 if vm = wm and zero otherwise. For any terminal node ~ z of ~ ¡±,
if the path from the root of the tree passes through the information set of om;2, hence also
the information set of om;1, then om;1's payo® at ~ z is um;1(vm;wm) where vm and wm are the
unique choices of the two players on the path to ~ z; otherwise his payo® is zero. Observe that16 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
if player 1 eschews strategies in S¤
1 then play will pass through the information set of each
om;2.
We need more notation to de¯ne the payo®s of the other players. Given a pure strategy
Qm of om;3, there exists a unique multisimplex Lm£Tm of Lm£Tm that contains it. For each
pure strategy wm of om;2, and each vertex (vm;tm) of Lm£Tm, de¯ne uwm(Qm;(vm;tm)) = 1
if gm(vm;tm) = wm and 0 otherwise. Extend uwm to a multilinear map over Lm £ Tm. Since
Lm £ Tm is full-dimensional, it extends to a multilinear map over Pm £ ¢(R) that we also
call uwm.
Let °m be the piecewise-a±ne function associated with the polyhedral complex Pm | see
[13, Appendix C] for details. For each polyhedron Qm in Qm, the restriction of °m is a±ne
and hence has a unique extension uQm to the whole of Pm £ ¢(R).
The payo®s to om;2 and om;3 at a terminal node ~ z are de¯ned as follows. Their payo®s
from ~ z are zero unless the path from the root of the tree to ~ z has the following features:
player 1 chooses s±;v at some node v on the path to ~ z, the implementation of s±;v then has
type t playing m on the path to ~ z, player 2 plays some response r after seeing m, player
om;2 plays some vertex wm, and om;3 plays Qm. In these exceptional cases, om;2's payo® is
uwm(Qm;(t;r)) and om;3's payo® is uQm(t;r), where t is the belief that assigns probability
1 to t. By the construction of s±;v, if after a pure strategy choice v = (vm) of the ¯rst set
of outsiders, player 1 plays s±;v, player 2 chooses ½m after m, player om;2 chooses wm, and
player om;3 chooses Qm, then player om;2's expected payo® is ±uvm(Q;(pvm;½m)) and om;3's
is ±uQm(pvm;½m).
II. Proof that no sequential equilibrium satis¯es Axioms B and S.
Recall that the metagames ~ ¡± are constructed on the supposition that for some solution
S




± or qm is inessential for some unsent message m 2 M±. For each
su±ciently small ± > 0, Axioms B and S require that some sequential equilibrium ~ ¾± of
the metagame ~ ¡± is equivalent for the insiders to an equilibrium of ¡ in the solution S
¤.
Also, genericity of payo®s implies that in ~ ¡± the outcome of ¾± for insiders is the same as
the outcome in ¡ of all equilibria in the solution S
¤. The following proof shows that the
supposed existence of these sequential equilibria leads to a contradiction, thus verifying that
the supposition is false.
For player 2, let ~ Á± be a consistent belief for which her strategy ~ ½± in the equilibrium ~ ¾±
of the metagame ~ ¡± is sequentially rational. In the metagame she observes only 1's message,
so after a message in m 2 M¤ her strategy must be ½¤
m, and after seeing an unsent message
m 2 M±, her strategy must be some ~ ½±
m 2 S
¤
m and be an optimal reply to her belief ~ Á±
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Consider a sequence of such metagames ~ ¡± and their equilibria ~ ¾± for which there is a
convergent subsequence ~ ¾± ! ~ ¾0 as ± declines to zero. In particular, ~ ½±
m ! ~ ½0
m and since
S
¤ and hence S
¤
± are closed, (~ ½¤
m)m2M± 2 S
¤
±. For a further subsequence the support of
the strategy at each information set of each player is constant, and 2's beliefs converge
~ Á±
m ! ~ Á0
m for each m. For outsiders om;1 and om;2, let V ±
m and W ±
m be the supports of their
strategies along the subsequence, let V 0
m and W 0
m be the supports of the limit strategies, and
let V ±;W ±;V 0;W 0 be the corresponding product sets.
Step 1: Characterization of player 2's beliefs
For each ± in the subsequence and each v 2 V ±, let "
±;v
m;t be the probability that player 1
at his node v sends message m for type t by choosing a strategy other than s±;v, i.e. "
±;v
m;t is
the probability at 1's information set after observing v = (vm0)m02M± of playing a strategy





m;t. For each collection v = (vm) of




We claim that along the subsequence, if "
±;v
m;t is positive for some v 2 V ± with probability
~ ¼±(v) > 0 then for 1's type t, sending message m yields the payo® v¤
t when anticipating 2's
strategy ~ ½0
m. Indeed, if "
±;v
m;t is positive then there is some strategy s 6= s±;v that for type t
sends message m and that has positive probability of being chosen by 1 at his information
set following v. Thus this strategy must do at least as well as the strategy s±;v along the
subsequence. In the limit s0;v is an equilibrium strategy yielding the equilibrium payo®
P
t0 ¼t0v¤
t0. Thus s yields this payo® in the limit. In particular this implies that for type t,
sending message m yields v¤
t when 2's strategy is ~ ½0
m. Suppose for some m 2 M±, and some
v 2 V ±, either ~ ¾±
1(s±;v) or "
±;v
m;t is positive for some t, then Bayes' rule is well-de¯ned and so


























For each m 2 M±, t 2 T and v 2 V ±, we claim that ~ ¼±(v)"
±;v
m;t=± 6! 1 as ± # 0. Indeed, were
this not true for some message m, then the above formula for ~ Á±
m(t) is valid and the limiting


























As we argued above, for each v 2 V ± and each t such that "
±;v
m;t is positive along the sequence,
message m for type is optimal against ~ ½0
m. Thus ~ Á0
m, for which ~ ½0
m is an optimal reply, gives
positive probability only to types t0 for whom sending message m yields their equilibrium
payo®s v¤
t0 against ~ ½0
m. But we proved previously in Subsection 4.3.2 that this is impossible
for the assumed set of generic payo®s. Hence, for a further subsequence, lim±#0 ¼±(v)"
±;v
m;t=±
exists and is ¯nite as claimed. Thus de¯ne ´v







An implication of the above conclusion is that in the limit, at each vertex v 2 V 0 the
probability of player 1 choosing s0;v is lim±#0 ~ ¾±
1(s±;v) = 1. Therefore, Bayes rule can be used
to compute ~ Á±


























where V ± = V 0 for ± su±ciently small. If ´v
m;t > 0 for some v and t then it is optimal for type
t to send m when anticipating ~ ½0
m. Hence the above formula implies that ~ Á0








and a conditional distribution ~ '0
m in Pm derived from (´v
m;t) whose support is within the
nonempty set of types t who get payo® v¤
t by sending message m. Therefore (~ p0
m; ~ ½0
m) 2 Xm.
As argued above, in the limit player 1 plays s0;v with probability 1 after v 2 V 0. So along
the subsequence he plays this strategy with positive probability at each such v. Therefore,















Step 2: Characterization of outsiders' strategiesAXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 19
Next we establish implications of sequential rationality for the outsiders. We claim that
for each unsent message m 2 M±:
(1) Suppose that the support W ±
m of ~ ¾±
om;2 is a simplex of K. Then the support V ±
m of
~ ¾om;1 is face of this simplex.




m), where according to ~ ¾±, ~ ½±
m is the response by player 2 after seeing m. Then
w±
M is a face of the simplex that contains gm(~ p±
m; ~ ½±
m) in its interior.




When player om;1 chooses his action he knows that play will pass through om;2's information
set. Since he wants to mimic om;2, sequential rationality at his information set implies (1).
Let L0
m £T 0
m be the multisimplex that contains (~ p±
m; ~ ½±
m) in its interior, and let K± be the
simplex that contains gm(~ p±
m; ~ ½±) in its interior. Fix Qm in the support of om;3's strategy.
Conditional on player 1 avoiding strategies in S¤
1, player om;2's payo® when he chooses a





















Let Lm £ Tm be the multisimplex that contains Qm. Then L0
m £ T 0
m is a face of Lm £ Tm.
And, the above payo® to wm is positive i® it is the image of one of the vertices of L0
m £ T 0
m
under gm. Clearly, these vertices wm of Km are the vertices of the simplex K± that contains
gm(~ p±
m; ~ ½±) in its interior. Since Qm was an arbitrary element in the support of om;3's strategy,
the best replies indeed form a face of this simplex, which veri¯es (2).





































Thus the support of om;3's strategy is contained in the set of polyhedra that contain the
point (~ p±
m; ~ ½±




m) in its interior. And, the vertices in V ± span a face of K±
m. Hence ~ p±
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which is an average of pvm for vm 2 V ±
m, belongs to K±
m. Invoking a further subsequence if
necessary, we can assume that this simplex K±
m is the same for all ± > 0, say Km.
Step 3: Establishing the contradiction
At the limit, ~ p0
m and gm(~ p0
m; ~ ½0
m) both belong to Km. Since (~ p0
m; ~ ½0
m) belongs to Xm, by
construction this is impossible if the degree of the map qm is dm = 0. If the degree is
dm 6= 0 for all m 2 M± then (~ p0
m; ~ ½0
m) belongs to Am for all such m. This too is impossible
since then (~ ½0
m)m2M± = 2 S
¤
±. Therefore, for all small ± > 0 in a subsequence there is no
sequential equilibrium ~ ¾± of ~ ¡± that is equivalent for the insiders to an equilibrium in S
¤.
This contradicts Axiom B and/or Axiom S. ¤
Finally, Proposition 4.2 implies:
Proposition 4.3. S
¤ is a stable set of ¡.
The proof of Proposition 4.3 is provided in Appendix B.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
5. Concluding Remarks
5.1. Set-Valuedness and Connectedness. We allow a re¯nement to select sets of equi-
libria as solutions, but restrict solutions to be connected and closed. Here we provide a
justi¯cation for these conditions in terms of what we learn from signaling games.
Let S
¤ be a set of strategy pro¯les in a generic signaling game such that for every em-
bedding there exists a sequential equilibrium whose image is contained in S
¤. We are not
requiring here that S
¤ consist only of equilibria. The techniques of Section 4 show that S
¤
contains a component of admissible equilibria that is stable and hence satis¯es our axioms.
To see this, observe ¯rst that the set of equilibria of a generic signaling game has ¯nitely
many components of admissible equilibria and all equilibria in each component induce the
same outcome. For each component S of admissible equilibria, and for each message m that
is unsent in the equilibria of S, one can construct the set Xm as in Section 4. And S is
stable i® the projection from Xm to ¢(T) is essential for each unsent message m. Now if S
¤
does not contain a component of admissible equilibria that is stable, then for each S that is
stable we can choose a point ½(S) such that the projection of S
¤ to player 2's strategies does
not contain ½(S). This yields an embedding ( ~ G;f) such that the f-image of every sequential
equilibrium of the larger game has player 2 playing a strategy that is arbitrarily close to
some ½(S) for some stable set S.
Thus Axioms B and S require that the solution contains a component of admissible equi-
libria that is stable, and the proof also shows that all stable sets must be components ofAXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 21
admissible equilibria. Axioms B and S and a minimality axiom therefore imply that solu-
tions must be connected sets of admissible equilibria. That they must be set-valued follows
trivially since the only possible component of admissible equilibria that is a singleton is one
in which all messages are sent in equilibrium. We do not develop this alternative axioma-
tization here because, as an axiom, minimality lacks a decision-theoretic justi¯cation. But
this reasoning shows that imposing connectedness makes solutions as `minimal' as possible.
5.2. Alternative Axiom S. Axiom S has two parts. One part requires that if ( ~ G;f)
embeds G then the f-image of a solution of ( ~ G;f) is a solution of G. The second part
requires each solution of G to be the f-image of a solution of ( ~ G;f). In [16] we study a
re¯nement called metastability that implies a weaker version, say Axiom SW, in which the
second part is: each solution of G contains the image of a solution of ( ~ G;f). Metastability
invokes perturbations of players' best-reply correspondences rather than perturbations of
their strategies; alternatively, it can be obtained using homotopic essentiality rather than
homological essentiality.
A possible advantage of metastability is that its formulation adheres to a revealed pref-
erence perspective. In addition, Axiom SW and metastability allow embeddings to re¯ne
solutions, i.e. the solution of a general game contains many subsets that are projections of
solutions of metagames that embed it. This is one case in which presentations of a game
as embedded in metagames justi¯es further re¯nements of solutions via `focal points' in-
duced by particular classes of embeddings. However, Theorem 4.1 is valid with Axiom SW
and metastability replacing Axiom S and stability because, as shown in [16, Appendix E],
metastability coincides with stability for extensive-form games with generic payo®s. Hence
if payo®s are generic then no further re¯nement is possible.
5.3. Extensive-Form Analysis. Axiom S ensures that a re¯nement depends only on the
reduced normal form, yet the proof of Theorem 4.1 exploits a signaling game's extensive
form. A resulting advantage is that it reveals how stability translates into restrictions on
beliefs at information sets that are o® paths of equilibrium play. Moreover, the extensive-form
analysis translates readily into normal-form analysis of equilibria represented as lexicographic
probability systems (Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel [2]). That is, player 2's strategy after
a message that is not sent in equilibrium must be an optimal reply to her belief induced by
the second strategy in the LPS representation of 1's behavior, which in e®ect is what is
characterized in the proof here.
A similar method of proof su±ces in the case of general games in extensive form with
perfect recall, two players, and generic payo®s, as will be reported in a later paper. There22 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
too the requirements for stability translate into restrictions on the beliefs of one player after
observing an initial deviation from the equilibrium by the other player. The proof is more
complicated only because one must account for the possibility of subsequent deviations.
For general games with more than two players it seems clear that, besides strengthening
Axiom A to require that a solution contains only perfect equilibria, it will be necessary in
the proof to use LPS representations, and in particular to exploit the special form of LPS
representations in Govindan and Klumpp [9] to ensure explicitly that correlations among
players' strategies are excluded, which is only implicit in [2].
Appendix A. The Pseudo-Manifold Property
This appendix establishes that (Xm;@Xm) is a (jTj ¡ 1)-dimensional pseudo-manifold
with boundary. It uses the notation and de¯nitions in the text. In addition, recall that




Fix an unsent message m 2 M±. We ¯rst study the nature of strategic interaction when
some type t sends m and player 2 responds. Recall that ½m 2 Bm is admissible i® there
exists a belief pm 2 Pm with full support against which ½m is optimal. Therefore, the set of
admissible responses following m is expressible as a union of faces of the simplex Bm. Since
each face of Bm is described by the set of responses that have zero probability, there exists
a collection Rm of subsets of R such that the set of admissible best replies is the union over
R0 2 Rm of ¢(R n R0).
Let ¹ Bm be the polyhedron that is obtained as the set of ½m 2 RR that satisfy the following
system of inequalities and equation:
u1(t;m;½m) 6 v¤
t 8t 2 T
½m;r > 0 8r 2 R P
r2R ½m;r = 1
These are the responses following m that support the equilibrium outcome corresponding to
S
¤. Moreover, for every face there exist unique subsets T1 of T and R0 of R such that the
types in T1 are the ones who get a payo® of v¤
t from playing m against any point in this
face and the responses in R0 are the ones used with zero probability in every point in this
face. We write such a face as Gm(T1;R0). Observe that by our genericity assumption, the
dimension of Gm(T1;R0) is jRj ¡ jT1j ¡ jR0j ¡ 1.
Now the set of admissible strategies in ¹ Bm is the union over faces Gm(T1;R0) of ¹ Bm such
that R0 2 Rm. Let S
²





m is a union of faces of ¹ Bm. Let P be the collection of all pairs (T1;R0) such
that Gm(T1;R0) is contained in S
²
m.
Fix now a face Gm(T1;R0) in ¹ Bm that is nonempty. Let Fm(T1;R0) be the set of pm 2 Pm
such that there exists ¸ 2 [0;1] and Ám 2 ¢(T1) such that the responses in R n R0 are all
optimal replies against ¸pm + (1 ¡ ¸)Ám.
Claim A.1. Fm(T1;R0) is a nonempty polyhedron of dimension jT1j + jTj ¡ jRj + jR0j.
Moreover, for each point pm 2 Fm(T1;R0) there exists a unique ¸m 2 (0;1] and a unique
Ám 2 ¢(T1) if ¸m < 1 such that the responses in R n R0 are all best replies against ¸mpm +
(1 ¡ ¸m)Ám. Moreover ¸m is a continuous function of pm.
Proof of Claim. Since Gm(T1;R0) is nonempty and has dimension jRj ¡ jT1j ¡ jR0j ¡ 1,
jR n R0j > jT1j. By genericity of player 2's payo®s, there does not exist a belief in ¢(T1)
against which the strategies in RnR0 are all equally good replies. Therefore, if these strategies
are all best replies against a strategy of the form ¸mpm + (1 ¡ ¸m)Ám where Ám 2 ¢(T1),
then ¸m > 0. Thus, Gm(T1;R0) is the set of pm 2 Pm such that there exist ´ 2 RT1 and




t2T1 u2(t;m;r)´t ¡ vm = 0 8r 2 R n R0 P
t2T u2(t;m;r)pm(t) +
P
t2T1 u2(t;m;r)´t ¡ vm 6 0 8r 2 R0
´ > 0
pm > 0 P
t2T pm(t) = 1
By de¯nition there exists a belief pm with full support against which the strategies in ¢(Rn
R0) are all best replies. By genericity of player 2's payo®s, therefore, the set of such pm
against which these strategies are the only best replies is a nonempty set of dimension
jTj ¡ jR n R0j. Since these solutions correspond to points of the form (pm;0;vm) that solve
the above system, the coe±cient matrix for the equations in the system has full row-rank.
Moreover, by genericity, if there exists a solution to the system then there exists one where
all the inequalities are strict. Hence, the set of solutions to this system has dimension
jTj + jT1j ¡ jR n R0j. The projection of the solutions to Pm is Fm(T1;R0).
Next we show that for each pm 2 Fm(T1;R0) there exists a unique (´;vm) that solves the
system. Fix pm 2 Fm(T1;R0) for which there exists (´;vm) that solves the system. Consider
the following subsystem, which has jR n R0j equations in jT1j + 1 variables.
P
t2T1 u2(t;m;r)´t ¡ vm = ¡
P
t2T u2(t;m;r)pm(t) 8r 2 R n R0 P
t2T1 u2(t;m;r)´t ¡ vm 6 ¡
P
t2T u2(t;m;r)pm(t) 8r 2 R0
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The result is proved if we show that the matrix of coe±cients for equations in the system
has row-rank jT1j + 1. This last point follows from the fact that if the row-rank were less
then there would exist a point (´0;v0
m) that solves the following system:
P
t2T1 u2(t;m;r)´t ¡ vm = 0 8r 2 R n R0 P
t ´t = 1
which is impossible by our genericity assumption that implies jR n R0j > jT1j. Hence, for
each pm 2 Fm(T1;R0) there exists a unique (´;vm) that solves this system. The fact that
¸m is continuous now follows, since for each pm 2 Fm(T1;R0), if (p;´;vm) solves the above




The set Xm de¯ned in the text is now the union over all faces Fm(T1;R0) in S
²
m of the
product Hm(T1;R0) ´ Fm(T1;R0)£Gm(T1;R0). The following states and proves the pseudo-
manifold property invoked in the text in subsection 4.3.
Claim A.2. (Xm;@Xm) is a (jTj ¡ 1)-dimensional pseudo-manifold with boundary @Xm ´
f(pm;½m) 2 Xm j pm 2 @Pm g.
Proof of Claim. Since S
²
m is connected, Xm is connected too. Xm is the union of the (jTj¡1)-
dimensional polyhedra given by Hm(T1;R0) for (T1;R0) 2 P. Hence to ¯nish the proof it is
su±cient to show that every maximal proper face of one of these polyhedra Hm(T1;R0) is a
face of at most one other Hm(T 0
1;R0
0) and that it is not a face of another polyhedron i® for
every point (pm;½m) in this face, pm 2 @Pm. Consider now a polyhedron H0
m of dimension
jTj¡2 that is a face of some Hm(T1;R0). It is of the form Fm(T1;R0)£G0
m for a maximal face
G0
m of Gm(T1;R0) or it is of the form F 0
m £ G(T1;R0) for a maximal face F 0
m of Fm(T1;R0).
Suppose it is the former. Then exactly one of the inequalities de¯ning Gm(T1;R0) holds
with equality on G0
m. There are two possibilities. (1) ½m;r = 0 for some r = 2 R0. In this
case, (T1;R [ frg) belongs to P and Fm(T1;R0) £ G0
m is also a face of the polyhedron
Hm(T1;R0 [frg). (2) The payo® to some t = 2 T1 is v¤
t for all points on this face F 0
m. In this
case, (T [ ftg;R0) 2 P and Fm(T1;R0) £ G0
m is also a face of Hm(T1 [ ftg;R0). Consider
now the case where H0
m is of the form F 0
m £ Gm(T1;R0). There are now three possibilities.
(1) One of the inequalities for r 2 R0 holds with equality in the linear system constructed
in the proof of the previous claim. Since in the interior of F 0
m the other inequalities are
strict, pm in the interior of F 0
m have full support, i.e. R0 n frg 2 R, (T1;R0 n frg) 2 P and
Fm(T1;R0) £ G0
m is a face of Hm(T1;R0 n frg). (2) One of the inequalities ´t > 0 is zero
for t 2 T1; in this case H0 is a face of Hm(T1 n ftg;R0). (3) One of the pm(t) > 0 is zero
for some t 2 T; in this case H0
m is not a face of another full-dimensional polyhedron and
pm 2 @Pm for each (pm;½m) on this face. ¤AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 25
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 4.3
This appendix proves Proposition 4.3 in the text.
Proposition B.1. S




± and the projection qm : (Xm;@Xm) ! (Pm;@Pm)
is essential for each m 2 M±.
In outline, the proof constructs (1) an essential map f from an "-neighborhood in the
graph (X;@X) over the space (P;@P) of beliefs to a corresponding neighborhood (Y;@Y )
of S
¤ in the graph E of equilibria over the space (A;@A) of perturbed strategies, and (2)
a locally essential map g from the projection (Q;@Q) ½ (P;@P) of the neighborhood in














¡ ¡ ¡ ! (A;@A)
the assumed essentiality of the projection map ^ p implies the essentiality of the projection
map p that is required to establish that S
¤ is stable.
Proof. First we de¯ne the space (A;@A) of perturbed strategies. For each t, let At = f±¹t j
0 6 ± 6 1;¹t 2 ¢(M)g. A typical element of At is denoted ´t, and ¹ ´t ´
P
m ´t;m. Likewise
for each m, let Am = f±½m j 0 6 ± 6 1;½m 2 ¢(R)g. A typical element of Am is denoted
µm, and ¹ µm ´
P
r2R µm;r. Let A1 =
Q
t At, A2 =
Q
m Am, and A = A1 £A2. For each ´ 2 A1
let ³(´) = (³m(´))m2M where ³m(´) =
P
t2T ´t;m. For each ", let A"
1 = f´ j ³m(´) 6 "8mg,
A"
2 = fµ j ¹ µm 6 "8mg and A" = A"
1 £A"




For each (´;µ) 2 A de¯ne the perturbed game ¡(´;µ) in which the payo® to player t
when he sends message m and player 2 responds with ½m is the payo® he would get in ¡ if
player 2 responded with (1 ¡ ¹ µm)½m + µm, and similarly for player 2, if she plays response
r after message m and player 1 chose ¹, her payo® is the same as in ¡ if each type t chose
(1¡¹ ´t)¹t+´t. Note that we are not allowing a player's perturbation to a®ect his own payo®.
If (¹;½) is an equilibrium of ¡(´;µ) then say that (¹0;½0) is a perturbed equilibrium, where
¹0
t = (1 ¡ ¹ ´t)¹t + ´t and ½0
m = (1 ¡ ¹ µm)½m + µm for all t and m. Let E be the graph of the
perturbed equilibrium correspondence over A, i.e. E is the set of ((´;µ);(¹;½)) such that
(¹;½) is a perturbed equilibrium of ¡(´;µ). Let p be the natural projection from E to A. For
each " and each subset Y ½ E, let (Y ";@Y ") = Y \ p¡1(A";@A"). Because the A"'s form a
basis of polyhedral neighborhoods of 0 2 A, to show that S
¤ is stable it is su±cient to show26 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
that there exists a subset Y of E such that S
¤ = f(¹;½) j (0;¹;½) 2 Y g and (i) Connexity:
(Y " n @Y 1) is connected and dense in Y " for all small "; (ii) Essentiality: for some small "
the projection map from (Y ";@Y ") ! (A";@A") is essential in · Cech cohomology with integer
coe±cients. This is the requirement for ¤-stability in Mertens [24].
For each m 2 M¤, let R¤
m be the support of ½¤
m, player 2's equilibrium response after
m. For a ¯xed perturbation vector µ for player 2, consider the following system L1(µ) of
equations in the variables ½m 2 ¢m for m 2 M¤, and vt 2 RT:
u1(t;m;½m)½m;r ¡ vt = 0 8t 2 T;m 2 M¤
t
u1(t;m;½m)½m;r ¡ vt < 0 8t 2 T;m 2 M¤ n M¤
t
½m;r = µm;r 8m 2 M¤;r = 2 R¤
m
½m;r > µm;r 8m 2 M¤;r 2 R¤
m P
r ½m;r = 1 8m 2 M¤:
When µ = 0 this system has a unique solution that is the equilibrium strategies ½¤
m for
m 2 M¤ and the equilibrium payo® vector v¤. By genericity of player 1's payo®s, for each
m 2 M¤ n M¤
t , type t's payo® against ½m is strictly less than v¤
t. Therefore, it still has a
unique solution (½¤(µ);v¤(µ)) for all µ close to zero.
For a ¯xed vector ± = (±t)t2T of positive numbers, and a perturbation ´ 2 A1, consider
the following system L2(´;±) of equations in the variables (¹t;m)t2T;m2M¤ and (vm)m2M¤:
P
t ¼tu2(t;m;r)¹t;m ¡ vm = 0 8m 2 M¤;r 2 R¤
m P
t ¼tu2(t;m;r)¹t;m ¡ vm < 0 8m 2 M¤;r = 2 R¤
m
¹t;m = ´t;m 8t 2 T;m 2 M¤ n M¤
t
¹t;m > ´t;m 8t 2 T;m 2 M¤
t P
m2M¤
t ¹t;m = 1 ¡ ±t 8t 2 T:
When the ´t's and ±t's are zero, this system has a unique solution: equilibrium strategies
for player 1 as well as the unconditional payo®s for player 2 after seeing message m 2 M¤.
Since this solution is unique, it continues to have a unique solution when ± and ´ are close
to zero. The strategy component of the solution is denoted ¹¤(´;±) for small but positive ±
and ".
For m 2 M± and each face Fm(T1;R0) of S
¤
± (which equals S
²
± by assumption here and
according to Proposition 4.2 in the text) and each ¯xed µ 2 A2 and v 2 RT, consider the set
of solutions Gm(T1;R0;µ;v) to the following system:
u1(t;m;½m) = vt 8t 2 T1
u1(t;m;½m) 6 vt 8t = 2 T1
½m;r = µm;r 8r 2 R0
½m;r > µm;r 8r = 2 R0 P
r ½m;r = 1:AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 27
The solution when µ = 0 and v = v¤ is exactly Gm(T1;R0). So for µ and v close to
zero and v¤ respectively, Gm(T1;R0;µ;v) is a polyhedron of dimension jRj ¡ jT1j ¡ jR0j ¡ 1.
Moreover, there is a homeomorphism hT1;R0;µ;v from Gm(T1;R0) to Gm(T1;R0;µ;v) that maps
vertices to vertices and everything else by linear interpolation. The vertex map for this
homeomorphism has the property that the same set of inequalities that hold with equality at
a vertex in Gm(T1;R0) hold under its image in Gm(T1;R0), albeit with di®erent constants.





m(µ;v) be the union over (T1;R0) 2 P of Gm(T1;R0;µ;v). Then
these homeomorphisms hT1;R0;µ;v






For each m, each (pm;½m) 2 Xm, and each type t, by Claim A.1, the map ¯t;m is well-
de¯ned and continuous, where ¯t;m(pm;½m) ´ pm(t) + ¸¡1
m (1 ¡ ¸m)Ám(t) for ¸m 2 (0;1] and
Ám 2 Pm such that ½m is a best reply against ¸mpm + (1 ¡ ¸m)Ám and the support of Ám
is contained in the set of types for whom sending m yields v¤
t against ½m. Let c be the
maximum of ¯t;m(pm;½m) over all m, t, and (pm;½m) 2 Xm.
Fix ¹ " such that the following are well-de¯ned:
(1) the solution (½¤(µ);v¤(µ)) to the system L1(µ) for µ 2 A¹ "
2.
(2) ¹¤(´;±) for all ´ 2 A¹ "
1 and ± 6 ¹ "jM¤j + ¹ "jM±jc.
(3) The homeomorphism h
µ;v¤(µ)
m for all µ in A¹ "
2 and m 2 M±.
Let P =
Q
m2M Pm and Q = [0;1]M £ P £ A2. For each 0 < " 6 1, let Q" be the set of
(³;p;µ) 2 Q such that ³m 6 " and ¹ µm 6 " for all m. Denote the topological boundary of Q"
by @Q". Let ^ X be the set of ((³;p;µ);½±) 2 Q£B± such that for each m 2 M±, (pm;½m) 2 Xm.
And let ^ p be the projection map from ^ X to Q. For each " let ( ^ X";@ ^ X") = ^ p¡1(Q";@Q").
We now de¯ne the map f : ( ^ X¹ ";@ ^ X¹ ") ! (E¹ ";@E¹ ") as follows. Let f((³;p;µ);½±) =
(~ ´;µ; ~ ¹; ~ ½) where:
~ ´t;m = ³mpm(t) 8t;m




t ~ ¹t;m 8t
~ ¹t;m = ¹¤
t;m(~ ´; ~ ±t)
~ ½m = ½¤
m(µ) 8m 2 M¤
~ ½m = hµ;v¤(µ)(½m) 8m 2 M±
Let Y ¹ " be the image of ^ X¹ " under f. We claim that for each 0 < " 6 ¹ ", f induces a
homeomorphism between ^ X" n @X1 and Y " n @Y 1. Indeed, the inverse image (³;p;µ;½) of a28 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
point (~ ´;µ; ~ ¹; ~ ½) 2 Y " n @Y 1 under f is computed as follows.
³m =
P







(~ ½m) 8m 2 M±
We ¯rst show that S
¤ = f(~ ¹; ~ ½) j (0; ~ ¹; ~ ½) 2 Y g. If (0;¹;½) 2 Y , then for each (³;p;µ;½±) 2
f¡1(0; ~ ¹; ~ ½), ³ = 0 and µ = 0. Hence, from the equations above de¯ning f, ~ ¹t;m = ¹¤
t;m for
each t, ~ ½m = ½¤
m for each m 2 M¤, and (~ ½m)m2M± = ½±, which belongs to S
¤
±. Therefore (~ ¹; ~ ½)
belongs to S
¤. Going the other way, if (~ ¹; ~ ½) belongs to S
¤
± then letting ~ ½± be the projection
of ~ ½ to S±, f((0;p;0); ~ ½±) = (0; ~ ¹; ~ ½) where for each m 2 M±, pm is such that (pm; ~ ½m) 2 Xm
and pm is arbitrary for m = 2 M±. Thus, S
¤ = f(~ ¹; ~ ½) j (0; ~ ¹; ~ ½) 2 Y g.
We turn now to the connectedness condition for Y ". For each m 2 M±, since (Xm;@Xm)
is a pseudo-manifold, Xm n @Xm is connected and dense in Xm. Therefore, for each 0 < ",
^ X" n @ ^ X1 is connected and dense in ^ X". For each 0 < " 6 ¹ ", f maps ( ^ X";@ ^ X") onto
(Y ";@Y "); and it maps ^ X" n @ ^ X1 homeomorphically onto Y " n @Y 1. Since the former set is
connected and dense in ^ X", the latter is as well. Therefore, Y " satis¯es the connectedness
condition for stability.
Finally, we show the essentiality of the projection p : (Y ";@Y ") ! (A";@A") for 0 < " 6 ¹ ".




m2M¤ Pm, and the
projection map ^ p is (up to reordering of coordinates) the product of the qm's on Xm's with just
the identity function on the remaining factors. Therefore, ( ^ X";@ ^ X") is a pseudo-manifold
whose projection ^ p has degree
Q
m2M± dm, which is nonzero by assumption. In particular, ^ p
is a cohomologically essential map. Let g : Q" ! A" be the map g(³;p;µ) = (´;µ) where for
each (t;m), ´t;m = ³mpm(t). Then g is a surjective map that maps Q"n@Q1 homeomorphically
onto A" n A1. Observe that g ± ^ p = p ± f in the commutative diagram
( ^ X";@ ^ X")
f










¡ ¡ ¡ ! (A";@A")
By the strong excision property [30, Theorem 6.5.5], f and g induce isomorphisms in coho-
mology. The essentiality of ^ p thus implies that the projection map p : (Y ";@Y ") ! (A";@A")
is essential. Therefore S
¤ is a stable set. ¤
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